Mark Zhandry

Mark Zhandry is an Associate Professor of Computer Science at Stanford University whose work sits at the intersection of theoretical cryptography and quantum computing. He previously worked as a Senior Scientist at NTT Research in the Cryptography & Information Security Lab and, before that, served as an Assistant Professor of Computer Science at Princeton University. His career has also included a postdoctoral position at MIT, and he has held visiting research roles in industry research labs. 

Mark’s research focus is on building and analysing cryptographic systems in a world where quantum computers change what is feasible for attackers and defenders. A core theme in his work is understanding how classical security proofs and cryptographic assumptions behave when adversaries can make quantum queries or run quantum algorithms, and how to design schemes that remain secure under those conditions. 

Alongside post-quantum cryptography, he has contributed to topics such as software obfuscation, idealised security models (for example, random oracles and related abstractions), watermarking and traitor tracing, and property-preserving encryption, as well as questions about what is possible or impossible using “black-box” proof techniques. His work also connects to longer-term cryptographic goals, such as unclonable or uncopyable programs and cryptographic tools that stay robust even when future compromises occur. 

He earned his PhD in Computer Science from Stanford University after completing an undergraduate degree with Highest Honors at the University of California, Berkeley, and later undertook postdoctoral studies at MIT. He is a recipient of the US National Science Foundation CAREER Award (awarded during his time at Princeton) and the Sloan Research Fellowship. His is research has also been recognised with four Best Paper Awards across major cryptography venues, reflecting repeated impact on core questions in modern cryptography and quantum security.

Mark Zhandry is a computer scientist whose work focuses on theoretical cryptography and quantum computing. He is an Associate Professor of Computer Science at Stanford University. In parallel with his academic work, he has also held senior research roles in industry, including as a Senior Scientist at NTT Research in the Cryptography & Information Security (CIS) Lab. He is broadly interested in computer science theory, but most of his research sits where modern cryptography meets the reality of quantum computation.

Mark’s academic training began at the University of California, Berkeley, where he completed his bachelor’s degree with Highest Honors. He then moved to Stanford University for doctoral study in computer science, where he carried out research in cryptography and related theory, and later completed postdoctoral work at MIT. Across these stages, he built a research direction that treats quantum computing as both a challenge to existing security assumptions and a source of new cryptographic possibilities. 

After his postdoctoral period, he joined Princeton University’s Department of Computer Science as an Assistant Professor. During this period, his work continued to develop core tools for “quantum-aware” cryptography, including proof techniques and security models that remain meaningful when attackers can run quantum algorithms or make quantum queries. While based at Princeton, he received a US National Science Foundation CAREER Award for a project on cryptography and privacy in the age of quantum computers, which supported his early-career research programme. In 2021, he was also named a Sloan Research Fellow, an award given to early-career researchers in the United States and Canada.

Mark’s research agenda covers several connected areas. A central theme is post-quantum cryptography: designing systems that can stay secure even if large-scale quantum computers become practical. This includes not only choosing assumptions that are believed to resist quantum attacks, but also rebuilding parts of cryptographic theory that rely on classical proof methods. One recurring issue is that many classical security proofs use “rewinding”, a technique that is often not directly compatible with quantum attackers because quantum states cannot generally be copied and replayed in the same way. In a published Q&A about his work, he explains how this mismatch can break traditional reductions and why new proof techniques are needed for quantum settings. 

A second major strand of his work is obfuscation, which asks whether it is possible to hide secrets inside software in a mathematically meaningful way. Rather than relying on informal tricks like renaming variables or adding dummy code, modern obfuscation research aims for rigorous guarantees based on hardness assumptions. On his research page, he describes this area as one where new mathematical approaches may limit an attacker’s ability to extract hidden information, and he connects it to broader cryptographic applications. 

He also works on idealised models in cryptography, such as the random oracle model and related abstractions. These models are widely used to justify the security of practical systems, even when standard-model proofs are not available. Mark’s interest in idealised models includes understanding where such models provide reliable guidance, where they can be misleading, and how to refine them to capture known gaps between ideal objects and real implementations. 

Another area he studies is watermarking and traitor tracing, where the aim is to embed information into programs (for example, decryption functionality) so that misuse can be traced, while still protecting honest users and handling collusion. He also works on “black-box impossibilities”, which are results that show certain cryptographic goals cannot be achieved using particular classes of techniques, helping researchers avoid dead ends and understand what kinds of assumptions or methods are actually needed. His interests further include property-preserving encryption, where encryption deliberately reveals limited relations such as equality or order while trying to hide everything else, and the bounded storage model, where security is analysed against attackers who are limited by how much data they can store. 

Mark’s publication record spans flagship venues in cryptography and theoretical computer science, and includes repeated work on quantum aspects of security definitions and constructions. One well-known result is his work on “quantum lightning”, a concept related to public-key quantum money and the no-cloning principle, where the goal is to create quantum states that cannot be duplicated even by an adversary who helps generate them. This work received a Best Paper award at EUROCRYPT 2019. 

Another recognised contribution is “The Magic of ELFs”, which introduced and developed the concept of extremely lossy functions and explored their cryptographic power; Princeton’s computer science department reported that this work received a “Best Young Researcher” award at CRYPTO 2016. He also co-authored “Full Quantum Equivalence of Group Action DLog and CDH, and More”, a paper that was awarded Best Paper at ASIACRYPT 2022 and studies the quantum relationship between discrete logarithms and Diffie–Hellman-type problems in the setting of group actions. His personal site notes that he has received four Best Paper Awards overall. His publications list and quantum publications page also indicate that a later work on one-shot signatures received a Best Paper award at CRYPTO 2025, reflecting continued impact in the area of quantum cryptographic primitives. 

Alongside research, Mark is involved in teaching and academic supervision at Stanford. Stanford Profiles lists him as teaching courses including “Quantum Cryptography” and “Big Ideas in Cryptography” in the 2025–26 academic year, and it also lists doctoral advising activity. He is also open about admissions norms for PhD applicants, noting that Stanford admits students at the programme level rather than directly into individual faculty groups, and that admitted students can then discuss mutual research interests.

Mark Zhandry’s vision is to build cryptographic systems that remain secure in a world where quantum computers are real and widely available. He aims to rethink the foundations of cryptography so that security proofs, assumptions, and constructions continue to work against quantum attackers. At the same time, he seeks to use the unique properties of quantum mechanics to create new cryptographic tools that were not possible before, such as unclonable programs and stronger forms of data protection. An important part of his vision is clarity and rigour, ensuring that cryptographic theory provides reliable guidance for real systems used by society in the long term.

Mark Zhandry has received several major awards in recognition of his contributions to cryptography and quantum computing. He is a recipient of the US National Science Foundation CAREER Award, which supports early-career researchers with strong research programmes. He was also awarded the Sloan Research Fellowship, given to promising scientists in the United States and Canada. His research papers have been recognised with four Best Paper Awards at leading cryptography conferences, including EUROCRYPT and ASIACRYPT. These honours reflect the impact of his work on post-quantum security, cryptographic theory, and the development of new proof techniques for quantum settings.